had an earlier influential encounter with James's work when he read The Principles of Psychology in September 1894. Russell's reaction was very favourable but is often unacknowledged. Though he never withdrew his criticisms of James's pragmatism, nor his objections to James's manner f doing philosophy, he did exempt The Principles ofPsychology from them. In an article written for The Nation on James's death, Russell·said that James "was at his best where he had concrete facts to deal with", and he went on to single out the Psychology for special praise. It was, he said, "by far the most delightful and readable book on the subject".l
Russell's interest in the Psychology is demonstrated by the great number of marginalia in his copy.2 There are 450, all in pencil, in a count 1 "The Philosophy of William James" (1910), Papers 6: 268.
2 Russell's copy is the British issue (London: Macmillan, 1891) ofthe third printing of the first American edition (2 vols., New York: Henry Holt, 18 9 0 ). The copy, in his library at McMaster University, is signed "B. Russell I May 1894" and bears the bookplate of Bertrand and Alys Russell. All page references. except where otherwise noted, will be to this edition. The widely available Dover reprint (195 0 ) has the same pagination.
russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives
McMaster University Press n.s. 17 (winter 1997--98) : 1 2 3-7 0 ISSN 0036-01631 spanning the two volumes. The second volume, however, is much more extensively marked than the first. The 357 marginalia in the second volume account for approximately 80 percent of the total. Although 3 2 8 of the marginalia consist of vertical lines or underlinings without any explanatory remarks, it is still possible to ascertain some general themes in James with which Russell was' particularly preoccupied. Junes's long chapter on "The Perception of Space" (2: 134-282) accounts for nearly one third of the marginalia in the second volume. There are 94 markings in this chapter, including sixteen verbal comments. Also, the final chapter, "Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience", on the epistemology of the special sciences, seemed to have piqued Russell's interest, as it contains 40 marginalia.
Russell read the Psychology just as he was starting work on his Cambridge fellowship dissertation, which was to be on the philosophy of geometry. This was submitted in August 1895 and formed the basis ofhis first philosophical book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry.3 Accordingly, the bulk of his serious reading from June 1894 to June 18 95 was on geometry, especially non-Euclidean geometry (which was a relatively new subject to him). That Russell's central concern in his dissertation is to argue for the partially a priori character of geometry explains his interest in James's chapter on space-perception. It also explains part of his interest in the chapter on "Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience", which contains a short section on geometry (2: 656-9). Russell marked this section heavily and is very critical, of James. However, the importance of the Psychology to Russell's work is evidenced in . the fact that he reread the whole of the second volume in June i895 when he was actually writing his dissertation.
Though the majority of his marginalia pertain to his dissertation, there are plenty of comments which reveal that he took a personal interest in the "concrete facts"-accounts of experiments, case histories, anecdotes-that James describes. Indeed, James's work is notable in its attention to such factual matters. James himself described the book as "mainly a mass ofdescriptive details" lacking "any closed system" (1: vii). It is significant that James's main contribution to theoretical psychology in the book, his theory of emotions now commonly known' as the in detail, which Russell thought a fair description ofhimself (55). Russell further comments that he is of "the auditory type", adding that "I never think except in words which I imagine spoken" (56). In Volume I, James relays the experience of an "exceptionally intelligent friend" who could not form an image of his breakfast table, but knew its contents by "verbal images exclusively" (I: 265), to which Russell responds: "this is almost my own case" (3).
In other cases, the autobiographical element is less explicit. We may suppose, for example, that the persistent interest Russell takes in James's description ofgenius is at least in part implicitly autobiographical. This interest may be noted throughout the marginalia, but occurs most obviously in a series of passages marked in Chapter XXII. Russell draws vertical lines beside James's assertions that genius is the "possession :ofsimilar association to an extreme degree" (2: 360), and that geniuses either create new associations, or expand upon and "obey" them (2: 361). The former class (which includes philosophers and scientists) James calls "abstract reasoners" or "analysts"; the latter (which includes artists and critics) are "the men ofintuitions". Lines appear similarly beside James's statements that an "analytic mind" is at a "higher stage" than an "intuitional one" (2: 3 6 3) and that an "intense interest or concentrated passion makes us think so much more truly and profoundly" (2: 3 6 7). It is hard not to suppose that Russell, in marking these passages, was gauging the temper of his own mind. During his first years at Cambridge, Russell had supposed that he would eventually meet some "really clever people '" whom I should at once recognize as my intellectual superiors" (Auto. I: 64). In his second year, however, he was "disappointed" to discover that he already knew the cleverest people at the university, even though this gave him "increased self-confidence" (ibid.). Russell's marginalia demonstrate his intellectual sharpness when he records his own results for some of the tests James mentions-for example, that he could simultaneously multiply 421 3 1 2 212 by 2 and recite four verses of poetry in six seconds (9), a curious attainment by anyone's standards.
AIthough it is less evident from the marginalia, Russell's personal interest in the Psychology went beyond an attempt to assess his own intellect. When Russell first read the Psychology, he was living in Paris where he was working as an honorary attache at the British Embassy. He had been sent there in a desperate attempt by his grandmother to prevent his marriage to AIys Pearsall Smith, a middle-class American woman five
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years older than himself Granny seems to have convinced herself that AIys was a scheming adventuress who had taken advantage of Bertie's youth and inexperience, and she did everything in her power to prevent the marriage. Her efforts came traumatically to a head in the summer of 1894 when, aided by her daughter, Russell's Aunt Agatha, and a suitably instructed family physician, she attempted to convince Russell that there was madness in both AIys's family and his own, and that any children they might have would suffer from insanity. As regards the Russell family, the allegations were certainly true (though the Pearsall Smiths boasted no more than a "peculiar" uncle).
Granny confronted Russell about Uncle Willy, a son of hers who from 1874 until his death in 1933 was incarcerated in a mental asylum in Middlesex after killing a fellow soldier while in the grip of a delusion. This was the first Russell had heard of Uncle Willy's madness, and though this plan failed to stop Russell from marrying AIys, he was understandably deeply perturbed by the fact that insanity was in his lineage. Russell wrote in his diary that his family was full of "ghosts and maniacs" and expressed the fear that he himself might go mad.5 It is hard to suppose that a twenty-one-year-old whose own sanity had thus been indirectly called into question would read a long work on psychology without any thought of how it applied to his own case. 6 In fact, he made surprisingly few comments on these topics, though actually there is little in James's Psychology about heredity. Several passages (2: 683-7) were marked with lines by Russell, including two about hereditary epilepsy in guinea-pigs. Such markings would be inexplicable but for the fact that Russell's own father had been diagnosed as an epileptic. The fact that he makes so little of these matters suggest that perhaps he was soon able to take Granny's revelations more in his stride than his initial reaction in his diary suggests.
More of Russell's markings concern the social and domestic consequences of falling in love with someone deemed unacceptable by one's family. For example, Russell drew a line beside James's assertion that "there is unquestionably a native impulse in every one to conceal love-5 «~Locked Diary'», Papm I: 65-6 (entry for 20-1 July 1894). 6 There is some further evidence of his interest from his reading in 1894. In September, just before he read James, he read Hereditary Genius by Francis Galton, the founder of eugenics. affairs" (2: 433), and James's remark that the "impulse to conceal is more apt to be provoked by superiors than by equals or inferiors" (ibid) is also marked by a line (see also 90).7 It is difficult to believe that Russell was not thinking of Granny and Aunt Agatha when he noted these passages, perhaps wishing he could have concealed his love for AIys, in light of the considerable turmoil his engagement had created at home. And, when James refers early on in the book to "speaking genially to one's aunt" as "the least thing in the world", Russell underlined the phrase (1: 126). It was, evidently, not the least thing in the world for him.
II. SOME PHILOSOPHICAL TOP~CS IN THE MARGINALIA
The main reason that Russell read James, however, was not to gain insight into his own psychological condition, but to prepare for writing his Cambridge fellowship dissertation. In his dissertation, Russell wanted to isolate the a priori in geometry from the purely empirical. For this, psychological data about the origin ofspatial concepts would be important if the enterprise was to be properly conducted in the light of the best available scientific evidence. James's chapter on space-perception (2: Chap. xx) was an important source of information for him on these matters. 8 We know from surviving correspondence that in October 18 94 Russell used the Psychology for a paper on "Geometrical Axioms" which was read to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club on 9 November 18 94. The psychological part of this paper left him dissatisfied: it was, he said, "the crux of the argument" but had been "treated much too sketchily, for want of the necessary knowledge".9 Accordingly, he tried again in the dissertation itself One ofits four chapters was on the "Psychological Origin of Space-reiations".10 For this he reread James's second volume in June 1895. 7 Russdl comments on his propensity for concealment in Auto. I: 3 8 . 8 Other important sources were Karl Stumpf's Ober der Psychologischen Ursprung tier RaumvorsteLLung( 18 73) and the wdl-known articles by Hdmholtz collected in the second volume ofhis Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen (1882.-95) . 9 Russell toAlys Pearsall Smith, 2.9 Oct. 1894. See N. Griffin, RusseLL's ldealistApprenticeship (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1991), p. u8, for further details about this paper.
Neither the paper on geometrical axioms nor the fellowship dissertation has survived,II and, although parts of the dissertation were included in An Essay on the Foundations ofGeometry and other writings with few substantial changes, the chapter on the "Psychological Origin of Space-relations" has disappeared without trace. The reason for this was its hostile reception by Russell's examiners, in particular his former philosophy tutor, James Ward. AIys Russell reported to Carey Thomas (I Feb. 1896) that the chapter had been "severely criticized" by the examiners, and that "Ward felt very strongly that it was not necessary for the logically complete treatment of the subject".
Unfortunately, Russell's marginalia provide less information on his early views ofspace-perception that we might have hoped. The majority of his markings in James's Chapter xx consist of underlinings or vertical lines in the margins intended to mark passages for future reference. His most frequent comments are "Quote" (68, 69, 72, 73, 75, 79) and "Important" (68, 70, 79)-unfortunately neither comment, in itself, indicates whether he agreed or disagreed with what James said in the passage thus marked. Moreover, in this chapter as elsewhere, some of his more extended comments concern the various optical tests and thought-. experiments that James describes-usually indicating that Russell had tried out the tests (82, see also 25 et aL). Though these comments reveal how carefully Russell read the book-and something of the habits of a well-trained mathematics student, who was accustomed to working through examples in the course of reading a book-they reveal nothing of Russell's position in his lost writings on space-perception.. Russell did not mark up James's chapter on space-perception uniformly. His selectivity is apparent in the way he marked James's discussion of the construction of real space. This section covered two topics: the division ofsensory spaces in order to permit measur~ment (of which Russell marked almost every page l 1-), and the combination into a single space of the various sensory spaces (which Russell did not mark at alI 13 ). The topics he did not mark extensively are also worth reporting.
11 See Griffin, pp. u8-2.3, for what is known ofthese two works. 11 The possibility ofmeasurement was the essential ground for Russell's general metrical geometry in An Essay on the Foundations ofGeometry and also in his dissertation. 13 The corrdation of the various sensory spaces to form a single subjective space should have been a concern in some of Russell's later work, e.g., in OKEW where he It is no surprise that he passed over passages on the physiology of perception (e.g., pp. , or James's long discussion of feelings in the joints and muscles (pp. [189] [190] [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] , and his discussions of spatial perception in the blind (pp. 2°3-10) . Much of this would be too narrowly empirical to interest someone whose main concern was with the a priori in geometry. It is more surprising that he ignored what James had to say on the selectivity of perception (pp. and "the choice of visual reality" (pp. , or the associated discussion ofoptical illusions (pp. , as these are certainly topics of philosophical interest.
Russell's marginalia concentrate overwhelming ly on three topics: James's treatment of spatial relations, and of the three-dimensio nality and measurability of space. Little can be learnt from the section on measurement, except for Russell's rather surprising comment on page 175: "may we regard motion as also logically prior to space? I don't see why not" (77). At first sight, the suggestion seems preposterous since motion is surely motion through space. But what Russell has in mind is presumably that kinaesthetic and locomotor sensations are an essential presupposition for acquiring the concept ofspace. Indeed, in An Essay on the Foundations ofGeometry, metrical space (i.e., space which admits the possibility of measurement) does logically presuppose the possibility of motion, since measurement is effected by congruence which involves the possibility of moving figures through space without distortion. In the Essay, however, motion is not a presupposition of every form of space.
Projective space, which is logically prior to metrical, does not involve measurement and thus does not presuppose motion. Russell's comment in James tends to confirm the view, supported by oPter evidence, that projective geometry did not figure importantly in his dissertation.
Regarding spatial relations and the three-dimensio nality of space, Russell took important doctrines from James. He accepted James's peculiar doctrine about the' nature of spatial relations and followed James in rejecting Berkeley's New Theory ofVision. The latter fact is not revealed in Russell's marginalia; we learn it ratber obliquely, through his relation with his future brother-in-law , the art connoisseur Bernard Berenson. Berkeley had argued that perception of distance must be a learned ability involving both sight and touch, since sight alone could only reveal the angle subtended by an object in the line of sight, and thus could not distinguish the angle subtended by a large, distant object from that subtended by a small, close one. Sight thus provided sensations in twO dimensions, and we acquire the third through experience involving both sight and touch.I5 James controvertS the theory at some length, taking account not only of Berkeley's work but of that of later writers, including Reid and Helmholtz (2: 212££). According to James, all sensation involves an inherent element of voluminousnes s (as he seeks to show with many examples, several marked by Russell). It is from this element of voluminousne ss alone that the notion of distance and the third-dimensio n arises (2: 134-44)· Russell marked several relevant passages with lines (e.g. on pp. 212, 213, 216, 218, 21 9) . He seems particularly impressed with James's argument that if the third dimension were arrived at, as Berkeley said, in a way radically different from that of the other two, it would not "feel" homogeneous with the others and would be unlikely to be commensurable with them (p. 216; Russell marked this passage with two lines).I6 He also wrote "Good" against a passage on page 21 5where James stresses 14 [New York: Putnam, 19091, p. 3)· 'S George Berkdey, An Essay towards a New Theory ofVtsion (17 0 9), § §ii-vi.
.6 However, he controverted another ofJames's arguments designed to show that the three-dimensiona lity of experienced space was a putdy visual phenomenon. James remarked on the curious fact that looking at a landscape with the head inverted gives "a startling increase in perspective" (Psychology, 2: 213). Russdl (80) that pureh' visual sensations were voluminous (and not merely extended).
The fact that Russell accepted James's critique of Berkeley was probably one reason for James Ward's objections to his dissertation, for Ward remained an adherent of Berkeley's theory. Ward's psychological views were stated first in his important article "Psychology" in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1886) , and then, at much greater length, in Psychological Principles.I? There is a remarkable degree of consistency between these two works, despite the long lapse between their publication. Although Ward does not refer to Berkeley's theory in the article, the book cites some of the grounds Berkeley gave in its favour and concludes that spatial magnitude (both real and apparent) presupposed the "tactual perception of space", that visual magnitude thus depended upon tactile magnitude, and that "distance is in the last reson entirely a tangible or locomotor magnitude" (pp. I53~4).
James's peculiarly empiricist view of relations is the second doctrine that Russell followed. James contrasts his own view With that of a "Plat-17 Cambridge U. P., 1918.
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onist" who treats a relation as "quite incommensurable with the data of sensibility between which it may be perceived to obtain" (p. 148). For James a relation, at least a spatial relation, is of the same type as its relata: "Just as, in the field of quantity, the relation between two numbers is another number, so in the field ofspace the relations are facts ofthe same order with the facts they relate" (p. 149). Russell marked this passage "Very important" (70), and he quoted it approvingly in the Essay (p. 171).
James's claim is certainly.an odd one, and his analogy does little to clarify his point. What does it mean to say that the relation between two numbers is another number? James adds to the confusion by further explanation:
When we speak of the relation of direction of two points towards each other, we mean simply the sensation of the line that joins the two points together.
The line is the relation. (Psychology, ibid.)
But suppose we imagine two points, say one above the other, joined by a line. How can the line be "the relation of direction" between them? There are two relations of direction-top-to-bottom and bottom-totop-but only one line.
All this material is heavily marked in Russell's copy ofJames. It would seem to be an extreme form of empiricism, and thus of very little use to someone, like Russell, who was investigating the a priori in geometry. The use Russell makes of it is even more puzzling, since it occurs as part ofan argument that any two points uniquely determine a line, especially in spherical geometry. But this is by no means guaranteed on James's account. Surely we can "see", "feel" or "imagine" (to stick to James's options) anyone of a number oflines connecting the two.
More intelligibly, Russell appeals to the doctrine in an attempt to reconcile his view that space is purely relational with the fact that it is infinitely divisible. He notes (Essay, p. 137) that talk of dividing a relation may seem absurd, but the absurdity vanishes if the relation is a line. The apparent substantiality of spatial lines, which is one of the fundamental antinomies which Russell as a neo-Hegelian finds in geometry, is, he thinks, "a psychological illusion, unavoidably arising from the fact that spatial relations are immediately presented" (Essay, p. 196)-a view for which James's support is cited.
If Russell found much to agree with in James's account of space-percept ion, he was much less favoura bly impress ed by James's accoun t of geomet ry later in the Psycholo gy. "This discussi on of Geome trical axioms is worthle ss", he wrote at the end of James's section on "Mathe matical Relation s" (119). It is not hard to find the reasons. James's extreme empiric ism would hardly have been congen ial to Russell' s aprioris m (c£ 113). The peculia rly neo-He gelian charact er of Russell' s enterpr ise is revealed in his next margin alium. James conside red two worlds, one in which "all objects were in flux" and one (harder to discern) in which "all things differed , and in which what propert ies there were were ultimat e and had no farther predica tes" (pp. 651-2). Russell' s comme nt that "our sensible world was, strictly, of both these kinds" and that "it was only logical necessit y that made us think otherwi se" (114), reveals how little faith he had that purely empiric al experie nce was capable of produc ing scientif ic knowle dge. It was "logical necessit y", exhibite d by the a priori principl es of knowle dge, that forced us to suppose the world more tractable for scientif ic theorizi ng. On one point, howeve r, James's views were more advance d than Russell' s. On page 658 James conside rs spaces of variable curvatu re, claimin g that a geomet ry "as absolut ely certain as ours" could be constructed for them. Russell rejects the idea emphat ically (118). One of his chief conclus ions about metrica l geomet ry in the Essay was that only spaces of constan t curvatu re were a priori possible . On this point, at least, it is easy now to see that James was right and Russell wrong.
III. TEXT OF THE MARGI NALIA
A full record of the passage s in James's Principl es ofPsych ology marked by Russell has been made and deposit ed in the Russell Archive s. In section III we give all those margin alia in which Russell supplie d a comme nt. Square bracket s in the Margin alium column are Russell' s own, as is all underli ning. Editori al comme ntary is enclose d in angle bracket s. All footnot es are the editors' . Russell employ ed his standar d manusc ript abbrevi ations in compos ing his margina lia. Since their meanin g is not doubtfu l, they have been expand ed silently here.IS 18 We would like to thank Ken Blackwd l for his careful editorial work on this paper.
To Descarte s belongs th~cred it of having & Hobbes?1 9 first been bold enough to conceive of a completely self-suff icing nervous mechan ism which should be able to perform complic ated and apparen tly intellige nt acts.
p. 242
Whateve r the content of the ego may be, it is cf Bradley in Mind 20 habitual ly felt with everythi ng else by us humans , and must form a liaison between all the things of which we become successiv ely aware.
p. 26)
An exceptio nally intellige nt friend informs me that he can frame no image whateve r of the appeara nce of his breakfas t- {cont.} "constitutes just <IS distinct an object of attention to I ass! the mind as if it were separated by an interval of empty space from the rest.... It is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of the figure implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude that the perception of figure by the eye is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous." Like Stout! 2 3 I tried the same, with the same result: the difficulty came at the beginning of every line of the poem.
Or again: "1 multiply 421 312 212 by 2; the operation takes 6 seconds; the recitation of 4 verses also takes 6 seconds. But the two operations done at once only takes 6 seconds, so that there is no Joss of time from combiningthem."
p. 4I9
"And it is reported of Newton that, while engaged in his mathematical researches, he sometimes forgot to dine."
5.p· 34 I
It <the present moment of consciousness> may this is paradoxical but I feel its own immediate existence-we have all daresay it is true along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspection to ascertain the factbut nothing can be known about it till it be dead and gone.
6·p·347
Even if the brain could not cognize universals, There is some resemimmaterials, or its 'Self', still the Thought' blance here to Locke's which we have relied upon in our account is not doctrine that matter the brain, closely as it seems connected with it; might think, only then and after all, if the brain could cognize at all, it would also be one does not well see why it might not cognize spirit!2 one sort of thing as well as another. The great difficulty is in seeing how a thing can cognize anything. This difficulty is not in the least removed by giving to the thing that cognizes the name of Soul. The Spiritualists do not deduce any of the properties of the mental life from otherwise known properties of the soul.
7·p· 393
In 'mediumships'or 'possessions'the invasion and Important. c£ Moses the passing away of the secondary state are both relatively abrupt, and the duration of the state is usually short-i.e., from a few minutes to a few hours. Whenever the secondary state is well developed no memory for aught that happened during it remains after the primary consciousness comes back. The subject during the secondary consciousness speaks, writes, or acts as if animated by a foreign person, and often names this foreign person and gives his history.
8·p·4 06
Even Dugald Stuart opines that every minimum visibile of a pictured figure
"On the day of his marriage the great Budaeus !!! forgot everything in his philological speculations, and he was only awakened to the affairs 'Of the external world by a tardy embassy from the marriage-parry, who found him absorbed in the composition of his Commentarii."
p.458
It <displacemem activity> drains away nerveTobacco currents which if pem up within the thoughtcentres would very likely make the confusion there worse confounded. But may it not also be a means of drafring off all the irrelevant sensations of the moment, and so keeping the attention more exclusively concentrated upon its inner task?
13·P· 4 6 7
Let it be a polygonal space, which we cut into <Russell has tried the triangles, and ofwhich we then affirm that it is experiment and has those triangles. Here the experimemation drawn a pentagon cut (although usually done by a pencil in the hands) into 5 triangles.> may be done by the unaided imagination.
P·4 68
They <conceptions> form an essentially disconThe important point is tinuous system, and translate the process of our that conceptions are perceptual experience, which is naturally a flux, discontinuous. into a set of stagnant and petrified terms.
15·P· 473
A universal or general conception is of an entire But an individual is class, or of something belonging to an entire universal at least in the class, of things. The conception of an abstract sense of persistence in quality is, taken by itself, neither universal nor time: cf. Bradley's particular.* If I abstract white from the rest of I..ogic. 24 the wintery landscape this morning, it is a perfectly definite conception, a self-identical quality which I may mean again; but, as I have not yet individualized it by expressly meaning to restrict 24 Bradley, Principles ofLogic, Bk. I, Chap. I, § §4-1O.
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it to this particular snow, nor thought at all of the possibility of other things to which it may be applicable, it is so far nothing but a 'that,' a 'floating adjective,' as Mr. Bradley calls it, or a topic broken out from the rest of the world.
16·p·493
It is the mind-dust theory, with all its difficulties But see Bradley on this in a particularly uncompromising form; and all point in Mind. 25 for the sake of the fantastic pleasure of being able arbitrarily to say that there is between the things in the world and between the 'ideas' in the mind nothing but absolute sameness and absolute not-sameness of elements, the notsameness admitting no degrees.
17· p. 499
The explanation (I devoutly expect) will be ?? Surely psychology is found some day to depend on cerebral condibound to seek a purely tions. Until it is forthcoming, we can only treat psychological solution. the sequence as a special case of the general law that every experience undergone by the brain leaves in it a modification which is one factor in determining what manner of experiences the following ones shall be (if pp. 232-236) .
18.p. SII And only when this different SETTING has come
? to each is our discrimination between the two flavors solid and stable.
p. SII
The names differ far more than the flavors, and Yes but the difference of help to stretch these later farther apart. Some name is not included in such process as this must go on in all our experi-that of taste ence. Beef and mutton, strawberries and raspberries, odor of rose and odor of violet, contract in applying this method is that we are so often in doubt whether anything has been added to S or not. Furthermore, ifwe simply take the smallest d about which we are never in doubt or in error, we certainly get our least discernible difference larger than it ought theoretically to be. 26 Later printings ofJames convert the second figure to "0.I10". 27 The quotation is from Stumpf's Tonpsychologie, I: III-2I. when it judges large differences, or differences between large terms, than when it judges small ones. But these ideas are really absurd. The hardest sort ofjudgment, the judgment which strains the attention most (if that be any criterion of the judgment's 'size'), is that about the smallest things and differences. But really it has no meaning to talk about one judgment being bigger than another. And even ifwe leave out judgments and talk of sensations only, we have already found ourselves (in Chapter VI) quite unable to read any clear meaning into the notion that they are masses of units combined. To introspection, our feeling of pink is surely not a portion of our feeling of scarlet; nor does the light of an electric arc seem to contain that of a tallow-candle in itsel£
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24.p.546
Compound things contain parts; and one such But v. Kant, Anticipathing may have twice or three times as many tionen der Wahrnehparts as another. But when we take a simple mung>8 sensible quality like light or sound, and say that there is now twice or thrice as much of it present as there was a moment ago, although we seem to
mean the same thing as if we were talking of compound objects, we really mean something different.
25· p. 57 6
If the word tooth now suddenly appears on the It has just happened so page before the reader's eye, there are fifty with me in reading this chances out of a hundred that, ifhe gives it time sentence. to awaken any image, it will be an image of some operation of dentistry in which he has been the sufferer.
26,p·579
Foot-ball and gas-jet are in no respect similarthat is, they possess no common point, no iden-James must then distintical attribute. Similarity, in compounds, is guish this similarity partial identity. When the same attribute appears from the "resemblance" in two phenomena, though it be their only he spoke of above as common property, the two phenomena are more ultimate than similar in so far forth. identity
27.p· 5 8I
... possibly neural laws will not suffice, and we meaning?
shall need to invoke a dynamic reaction of the form of consciousness upon its content.
28·p·5 8I
To sum up, then, we see that the difference 
p. 593
Recent writers, in fact, all reduce it <contrast> cf Welsh Guide-Book either to similarity or contiguity. Contrast "The torrent walk at always presupposes generic similarity.... Dolgelly has been EQ!l: trasted with the farfumed Drachenfels on the Rhine." Clearly reducible to similarity!
2 ·p·594
Everything else is pretty certainly due to cerebral ? laws. My own opinion on the question of active attention and spiritual spontaneity is expressed elsewhere. But even though there be a mental Surely this perpetual spontaneity, it can certainly not create ideas or reference to the brain is summon them ex abrupto. Its power is limited a methodological error.
to selecting amongst those which the associative machinery has already introduced or tends to But what does create introduce. If it can emphasize, reinforce, or ideas? To say "the protract for a second either one of these, it can brain" is the crudest do all that the most eager advocate of free will materialism. need demand; for it then decides the direction of the next associations by making them hinge upon the emphasized term; and determining in this wise the course of the man's thinking, it also determines his acts. 
34·PP·598-9
Belief in anything not present to sense is the Burne's definition very lively, strong, and steadfast association of the image of that thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.
35· p. 599
Judgment 
39·p· 62 7
Exactly parallel variations occur in our con-A space in a new place sciousness ofspace. A road we walk back over, seems far longer than hoping to find at each step an object we have when grown familiar: dropped, seems to us longer than when we this corresponds to the walked over it the other way. A space we slower passage of time measure by pacing appears longer than one we in youth. traverse with no thought of its length. And in general an amount of space attended to in itself leaves with us more impression of spaciousness than one of which we only note the Content.
.p.628
"<The only case in which> '" our perceptions This only amounts to can truly correspond with outer reality, is that of asserting the outer the time-succession of phenomena. Simultaneity, world to be a happensuccession, and the regular return of simultaneing, like the inner. ity or succession, can obtain as well in sensations as in outer events. Events, like our perceptions of them, take place in time, so that the timerelations of the latter can furnish a true copy of those of the former. The sensation of the thunder follows the sensation of the lightning just as the sonorous convulsing of the air by the electric discharge reaches the observer's place later than that of the luminiferous ether."3 1 
41.p. 6jI
43.p· 644
All the intellectual value for us of a state of mind depends on our after-memory of it. Only then is it combined in a system and knowingly made to contribute to a result. Only then does it count Cf suggestion above for us. So that the EF FECTIVE consciousness we that under anaesthetics have ofour states is the after-consciousness, and the we perhaps suffer but more of this there is, the more influence does forget. the original state have, and the more permanent a factor is it of our world.
44·p· 664
We may say, then, that a man's native tenaciry But it is just as easy to will fluctuate somewhat with his hygiene, and affect one's body as that whatever is good for his tone of health will one's mind by conduct also be good for his memory. We may even say that whatever amount of intellectual exercise is bracing to the general tone and nutrition of the brain will also be profitable to the general retentiveness.
45·P·67 6
I must confess that the quality of mystery seems Surely this is insuffito me a little strained. I have over and over again cient; the experience is in my own case succeeded in resolving the pheaccompanied by surnomenon into a case of memory, so indistinct prise, by a haunting that whilst some past circumstances are presfeeling at every 4th ented again, the others are not. The dissimilar occurrence: why, all this portions of the past do not arise completely happened before-& enough at first for the date to be identified. All yet often it never has we get is the present scene with a general sugges-really happened before
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tion of pastness about it. That faithful observer, so far as one can ascerProf. Lazarus, interprets the phenomenon in the tain. same way;* and it is noteworthy that just as soon as the past context grows complete and distinct the emotion ofweirdness fades from the experience.
46.p.678
Now, if I and 3 in the first list were learned in But surely some labour that order merely by I calling up 2, and by 2 would be saved by the calling up 3, leaving out the 2 ought to leave I fact that the individual and 3 with no tie in the mind; and the second words were known; I list ought to take as much time in the learning as should have thought if the first list had never been heard of.
this would make the 2nd process not purely associative. 
47·P· 68 9
But why not 'pool' our mysteries into one great This would surely be mystery, the mystery that brain-processes occamore than a mystery; sion knowledge at all? being, if true, itself knowledge, it would be a vicious circle.
VOLUME II, p. 7
Conceptual systems which neither began nor left applies to Metageooff in sensations would be like bridges without metry piers. Systems about fact must plunge themselves into sensation as bridges plunge their piers into the rock.
49.p.8
In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgement ofwhich would be betterexpressed by the bare interjection 'lo!'), the infant encounters causality, in the full sense in which any later object or system of objects has these things.
p. IO
The only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers This is only poor appear to be relations, relations without terms, Green's view-it is not or those terms are only speciously such and fair to foist it on Hegelreally consist in knots, or gnarls of relations finer ians in general)' still in infinitum.
p. un.
The ubiquity of the 'psychologist's fallacy' (see Good p. 19 6 ) in his pages, his incessant leaning on the confusion between the thing known, the thought that knows it, and the farther things known about that thing and about. that thought by later and additional thoughts, make it impossible to clear up his meaning.
.p.29
Similarly there is a chromatic minimum of size in c£ Stump£ll objects. The image they cast on the retina must needs'have a certain extent, or it will give no sensation of colour at all. 
p. 3 2
59·P·7 I
At night hearing a very faint striking of the hour I have often heard the by a far-off clock, our imagination reproduces chimes at night go on at both rhythm and sound, aud it is often difficult intervals for 5 or 10 to tell which was the last real stroke. So of a minutes & been quite baby crying in a distant pan of the house, we are unable to tell the real uncertain whether we still hear it, or only imagfrom the imagined ine the sound.
60·P·94
Take a single pair of crossed lines (Fig. 49) , hold [It is necessary to have them in a horiwntal plane before the eyes, and ' one's eyes on a level look along them, at such a distance that with the with the paper.] right eye shut, I, and with the left eye shut, 2., looks like the projection of a vertical line. 61·P·95 <Figure 50.> This illusion is extraordinarily vivid.
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Similarly at the so-called 'materializing seances' c£ the puzzled effort to which fraudulent mediums give: in a dark room harmonize sensation a man sees a gauze-robed figure who in a whiswith the expected perper tells him she is the spirit of his sister, ception on waking in a mother, wife, or child, and falls upon his neck. different place from that The darkness, the previous forms, and the of our dreams-it expectancy have so filled his mind with , becomes almost imposspremonitory images that it is no wonder he ible for a time to pass perceives what is suggested. These fraudulent from sensation to per-'seances' would furnish most precious docuception. ments to the psychology of perception if they could only be satisfactorily inquired into. In the hypnotic trance any suggested object is sensibly perceived. In certain subjects this happens more or less completely afrer waking from the trance. It would seem that under favorable conditions a somewhat similar susceptibility to suggestion may exist in certain persons who are not otherwise entranced at all. 
67·p· I47
This dement of constructiveness is present in a Hence maps still higher degree, and carries with it the same consequences, when we deal with objective spaces too great to be grasped by a single look. The rdative positions of the shops in a town, separated by many tortuous streets, have to be thus constructed from data apprehended in succession, and the result is a greater or less degree of vagueness.
68.p. I48
Distance-apart, too, is a simple sensation-the Important [quote] sensation of a line joining the two distant points: lengthen the line, you alter the feding and with it the distance fdt.
69· pp. I48-9
We may consequently imagine a disciple of this school to say to us in this point: "Suppose you have made a separate specific sensation of each line and each angle, what boots it? You have still the otder of directions and of distances to account for; you have still the rdative magnitudes of all these fdt figures to state; you have their respective positions to define before you can be said to have brought order into your space. And not one of these determinations can be effected except through an act of rdating thought, so that your attempt to give an account of space in terms of pure sensibility breaks down almost at the very outset. Position, for example, Quote in connexion can never be a sensation, for it has nothing with Congruence, with intrinsic about it; it can only obtain between a James's answer. When we speak of the relation of direction of how about relations of two points toward each other, we mean simply magnitude, i.e. ratios, of the sensation of the line that joins the two lines etc. v. p. 15I. points together. The line is the relation; feel it and you fed the relation, see it and you see the rdation; nor can you in any conceivable way think the latter except by imagining the former (however vagudy), or describe or indicate the one except by pointing to the other. And the moment you have imagined the line, the relation stands before you in all its completeness, with nothing further to be done. Just so the relation of direction between two lines is identical with the peculiar sensation of shape of the space enclosed between them. This is commonly called an angular relation.
72.P· I5 0 Rightness and leftness, upness and downness, are
Quote?
again pure sensations differing specifically from each other, and generically from everyffiing else. Like all sensations, they can only be indicated, not described. If we take a cube and label one side top, another bottom, a third front, and a fourth back, there remains no form ofwords by which we can describe to another person which 
p. I52
And even where we only feel one subdivision to Quote be vaguely larger or less, the mind must pass . rapidly between it and the other subdivision, and receive the immediate sensible shock of the more.
74.p· I5 2
we seem thus to have accountedfor all space<In the left margin:> i.e. 
relations, and made them clear to our understand-
75·P· I5 2
But inasmuch as all the subdivisions are them-? Quote selves sensations, and even the feeling of 'more' or 'less' is, where not itself a figure, at least a sensation of transition between two sensations of figure, it follows, for aught we can as yet see to the contrary, that all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom, and that, as the sensations lie together in the unity of consciousness, no new material element whatever comes to them from a supra-sensible source. 
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78• p. I77
The great agent in comparing the extent felt this also I believe holds by one sensory surface with that felt by another, logically as well.
is superposition-supetposition of one surface upon another, and superposition of one outer thing upon many surfaces.
p. I9 6
But when we say 'projection' we generally have Important. [Quote] in our mind the notion of a there as contrasted with a here. What is the here when we say that
the joint-feeling is there? The 'here' seems to be the spot which the mind has chosen for its own post of observation, usually some place within the head, but sometimes within the throat or breast-not a rigorously fixed spot, but a region from any portion of which ir may send forth its various acts of attention. Extradition from either of these regions is the common law under which we perceive the whereabouts of the north srar, of our own voice, of the contact of our teeth with each other, of the tip of our finger, of the point of our cane on the ground, or of a movement of our elbow-joint.
But fOr distance between the 'here' and the 'there' to befelt, the entire intervening space must be itselfan object ofperception.
p. 213
We may artificially exaggerate this sensation of <In the lefr margin:> depth. Rise and look from the hill-top at the <In the right, but and then with inverted headlook at the same. deleted:> this experiThere will be a startling increase in the perspecment does not prove tive, a most sensible recession of the maximum your point unless coldistance; and as you raise the head you can ours are unaltered by actually see the horizon-line again draw near. the inverted head.
81.p. 215
But suppose, to take a more complicated case, Good that the object is a stick, seen firsr in its whole length, and then rotared round one of its ends; let this fixed end be the one near the eye. In this movement the stick's image will grow progressively shorter; its farther end will appear less and less separated laterally from its fixed near end; soon it will be screened by the latter, and then reappear on the opposite side, and finally on 35 Cited in full in n. 16 above.
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that side resume its original length. Suppose thismovement to "become a familiar experience; the mind will presumably react upon it after its usual fashion (which is that of unifying all data which it is in any way possible to unify), and consider it the movement of a constant object rather than the transformation of a fluctuating one. Now, the sensation ofdepth which it receives during the experience is awakened more by the far than by the near end of the object. But how much depth? What shall measure its amount? Why, "at the moment the far end is ready to be eclipsed, the difference of its distance from the near end's distance must be judged equal to the stick's whole length; but that length has already been judged equal to a certain optical sensation of breadth. ; or, finally, (3) there is a quality produced out of the inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensations which, as given originally, are not spatial, but which, on being cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This last is the Kantian view. Stumpf admirably designates it as the 'psychic stimulus' theory, the crude sensations being considered as goads to the mind to put forth its slumbering power.
84·P·27 8
It seems to me that Helmholtz's genius moves Quote? most securely when it keeps close to particular facts. At any rate, it shows least strong in purely speculative passages, which in the Optics, in spite of many beauties, seem to me fundamentally vacillating and obscure.
85.p· 290n.
In both existential and attributive judgments cf. Bradley's Logic a synthesis is represented. The syllable ex in the Chap. II.
word Existence, da in the word Dasein, express it. 'The candle exists' is equivalent to 'The candle is over there.'
86.p. pI
To do anything is a relief. Accordingly, whatever MIND CURE remedy may be suggested is a spark on inflammable soil.
87·P· 3 22
Those to whom 'God' and 'Duty' are now mere If they were~names names can make them much more than that, if no one would sacrifice they make a little sacrifice to them every day.
to them.
P·7·
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p. 333
It <paper> is really all that it is: a combustible, a very Hegelian! writing surface, a thin thing, a hydrocarbonaceous thin'g, a thing eight inches one way and ten another, a thing just one furlong east of a certain stone in my neighbour's field, an American thing, etc. etc., ad infinitum.
pp. 427-8
"The little boy imitates soldiers, models clay I believe this difference into an oven, builds houses, makes a wagon out is mostly conventional of chairs, rides on horseback upon a stick, drives & educational. nails with the hammer, harnesses his brethren and comrades together and plays the stagedriver, or lets himself be captured as a wild horse by some one else. The girl, on the contrary, plays with her doll, washes and dresses it, strokes it, clasps and kisses it, puts it to bed and tucks it in, sings it a cradle-song, or speaks with it as if it were a living being.... This fact that a sexual difference exists in the play-impulse, that a boy gets more pleasure from a horse and rider and a soldier than from a doll, while with the girl the opposite is the case, is proof that an hereditary connection exists berween the perception of certain things (horse, doll, etc.) , and the feeling of pleasure, as well as berween this latter and the impulse to play. "37 90. pp. 432-3 Secretiveness, which, although ofren due to e.g. in myself it is absointelligent calculation and the dread of betraying lutely blind & instincour interests in some more or less definitely tive. foreseen way, is quite as ofren a blind propen<It is uncertain whether sity, serving no useful purpose, and is so stubRussell's comment born and ineradicable a part of the character as applies also to the last fully to deserve a place among the instincts. Its sentence opposite, but natural stimuli are unfamiliar human beings, below the comment he especially those whom we respect. Its reactions drew a line against the are the arrest ofwhatever we are saying or doing sentence.> when such strangers draw nigh, coupled often with the pretense that we are not saying or doing that thing, but possibly something different. Often there is added to this a disposition to mendacity when asked to give an account of ourselves.
91• pp. 439-40
"As soon as a wife becomes a mother her whole
Vastly German! thought and feeling, her whole being, is altered. Until then she had only thought of her own well-being, of the satisfaction of her vanity; the whole world appeared made only for her; everything that went on about her was only noticed so far as it had personal reference to herself; she asked of every one that he should appear interested in her, pay her requisite attention, and,as far as possible fulfil her wishes. Now, however, the centre of the world is no longer herself, but her child. She does not think of her own hunger, she must first be sure that the child is fed. It is nothing to her that she herself is tired and needs rest, so long as she sees that the child's sleep is disturbed; the moment it stirs she awakes, though far stronger noises fail to arouse her now. She, who formerly could not bear the slightest carelessness-o(dress, and touched everything with gloves, allows herself to be soiled by the infant, and does not shrink from seizing its clouts with her naked hands. Now, she has the greatest patience with the ugly, piping crycbaby (Schreihals), whereas until now every discordant sound, every slightly unpleasant noise, made her nervous. Every limb of the still hideous little being appears to her beautiful, every movement fills her with delight. She has, in one word, transferred her entire egoism to the child, and lives only in it. Thus, at least, it is all unspoiled, What kind ofan emotion of fear would be left if Of course there may be the feeling neither of quickened heart-beats nor internal bodily changes of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips which necessarily nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh accompany emotions, nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite but of conscious or impossible for me to think. Can one fancy the external ones I can find state of rage and picture no ebullition in the no trace in myself. chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their' stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person
or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief....
95· p. 455
We have, as Professor Lange says, absolutely no A corporeal feeling is immediate criteria by which to distinguish not material nor itself a between spiritual and corporeal feelings; and I physical process. may add, the more we sharpen our introspection, the more localized all our qualities of feeling become (see above, Vol. 1. p. 300) and the more difficult the discrimination consequently grows.
6 ·P·47 2
Very little emotion here! <in scientific and I have often found philosophical worlo-except the effort of setmyself panting on getting the attention fine, and the feeling of ease ting a solution of a and relief (mainly in the breathing apparatus) difficulty. when the inconsistencies are overcome and the thoughts run smoothly for a while.
97·P·4 82
It seems as if even the changes of blood-pressure But whatever is teleoand heart-beat during emotional excitement logically explainedm ight, instead of being teleologically deterhave also a mechanical mined, prove to be purely mechanical or physio-explanation: the teleological outpourings through the easiest drainage-logical is not ultimate or channels-the pneumogastrics and sympathetic complete. nerves happening under ordinary circumstances to be such channels.
8 ·P·42
Normally it is the remoter sensations which we So does the fact that receive by the ear which keep us from going many people if they astray in our speech. The phenomena of aphasia speak with their ears show this to be the usual case.
stopped speak very loud. that it results from a victory over his ideals, but· "unconquerable the moralist always speaks of his as a victory over will"4 0 which was exerhis propensities.
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cised along the lines of greatest resistance & was yet immoral. Such cases constitute a whole class of noble sinners, whom one instinctively admires.
103'P' 549
The ideal impulse appears, in comparison with No! this, a still small voice which must be artificially reinforced to prevail. Effort is what reinforces it, making things seem as if, while the force of propensity were essentially a fixed quantity, the ideal force might be ofvarious amount. But what determines the amount of the effort when, by its aid, an ideal motive becomes victorious over a great sensual resistance? The very greatness of the resistance itself. If the sensual propensity is small, the effort is small. The latter is made great by the presence of a great antagonist to overcome. And if a brief definition of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit the appearances than this: It is action in the line o/the greatest resistance. 104· p. 552n.
<Bains explanation of sociability and parental love by the pleasures of touch:> "It seems to me that there must be at the foundation that intense Poor fool! pleasure in the embrace of the young which we find to characterize the parental feeling throughout." was in the latter, because he would have apperceived it as a different total in the first instance.
III. pp. 6I2-I3
As so often happens, a fact is denied until a quite rightly too-a welcome interpretation comes with it. Then it is priori probabiliry has to admitted readily enough; and evidence judged be weighed as well as quite insufficient to back a claim, so long as the evidence. church had an interest in making it, proves to be quite sufficient for modern scientific enlightenment, the moment it appears that a reputed saint can thereby be classed as 'a case of hystero-epilepsy.'
pp. 6I7-I8
I shall try in the course of the chapter to make not logically i.e., there is plain three things:
no denial of such a I. That, taking the word experience as it is psychological explanauniversally understood, the experience of the tion necessarily race can no more account for our necessary or a involved-i.e. 
p. 657
Three of them <axioms> give marks of identiry Geometrical axioms. among straight lines, planes, and parallels. Straight lines which have two points, planes which have three points, parallels to a given line which have one point, in common, coalesce throughout. Some say that the certainry of our belief in these axioms is due to repeated experiences of their truth; others that it is due to an intuitive acquaintance with the properties of space.
p. 658
... and assuming a new relation means ceasing This is fearfully shallow. to be straight or plane. If we mean by a parallel a line that will never meet a second line; and ifwe have one such line drawn through a point, any new line drawn through that point which does PASSAGE IN Psychology<+ BR'S UNDERUNING) MARGINALIUM {cont.} not coalesce with the first must be inclined to it, and if inclined to it must approach the second, i.e., cease to be parallel with it.
118.p.658
A geometry as absolutely certain as ours could be No! invented on the supposition of such a space, if the laws of its warping and deformation were fixed.
119· p. 659
<Opposite the conclusion of this section of the chapter:> This discussion of Geometrical axioms is worthless.
12.0.p.664
Locke accordingly distinguishes between This is really Kant's 'mental truth' and 'real truth.'* The former is position too. , intuitively certain; the latter dependent on experience. Only hypothetically can we affirm intuitive truths of real things-by supposing, namely, that real things exist which correspond exactly with the ideal subjects of the intuitive propositions.
121.p.664
The eternal verities which the very structure of our mind lays hold of do not necessarily th~m-selves lay hold on extra-mental being, nor have they, as Kant pretended later,* a legislating ? character even for all possible experience.
122.p.668
The subjective interest leading to the assumpIn this chance coincition could not be more candidly expressed.
dence oflogical requireWhat makes the assumption 'scientific' and not ments with fact which merely poetic, what makes a Helmholtz and his James is always coming kin discoverers, is that the things of Nature turn back to, the need of a out to act as if they were of the kind assumed. metaphysic is very glarThey behave as such mere drawing and driving ing. 
p. 670
Such principles as these <metaphysical and But so was Helmholtz's aesthetic axioms>, which might be multiplied to postulate above satiety, are properly to be called postulates of rationality, not propositions of fact.
pp. 67o-I
It is not that these more metaphysical postucfKant lates of rationality are absolutely barrenthough barren enough they were when used, as the scholastics used them, as immediate propositions of fact. * They have a fertility as ideals, and keep us uneasy and striving always to recast the world of sense until its lines become more congruent with theirs. Take for example the principle that 'nothing can happen without a cause.'
p. 672
The moralprinciples which our mental struc-In shoft experienced ture engenders are quite as little explicable in morality is a logical toto by habitual experiences having bred inner contradiction since a cohesions. Rightness is not mere usualness, moral <"moral" over wrongness not mere oddity, however numerous deleted "logical"> judgthe facts which might be invoked to prove such ment is not a judgment identity. Nor are the moral judgments those about fact. most invariably and emphatically impressed on us by public opinion. The most characteristically and peculiarly moral judgments that a man is ever called on to make are in unprecedented cases and lonely emergencies, where no popular rhetorical maxims can avail, and the hidden oracle alone can speak; and it speaks often in PASSAGE IN Psychology<+ BR'S UNDERLINING) MARGINALIUM (cont.) favour of conduct quite unusual, and suicidal as far as gaining popular approbation goes.
126.p.676
Our consciousness of these <logical and but such modifications mathematical> relations, no doubt, has a natutal have been preserved by genesis. But it is to be sought tather in the inner natural selection. forces which have made the brain grow, than in any mere paths of 'frequent' association which outer stimuli may have ploughed in that organ.
